We know that metaphysics deals with the ultimate reality: what there is, what really exist? What is the real nature or fundamental structure of the material world? What is the intrinsic property of an object that it could not lack, even if it lacks the property it could not be what it is. I am in quest of that essential attribute that an object must have. How to get that essence: through description or by mere ostension? Are they attributive or directly referential, bare substratum? Is there any real property at all by which we can identify an individual? Is there any real connection between proper name and the individual itself? As Aristotle said Substances are the ultimate subject of predication. There must be a single substance of which we see the attributes. Now among these attributes which one is essential and which properties are accidental? For instance, being human, is an essential property of Socrates but being snub-nosed is an accidental one. In order to search of that essential attribute I have gone through an extensive survey of literature where I have started with Aristotle and followed up with in the views of Quine, Kripke, Plantinga and Adams. For Quine, To Be is To Be the Value of a Variable, words do not have any meaning of its own. It depends on the way we describe it. Quine attacked the possibility of ‘necessity’ on open context. Quine rejected the possibility of de dicto necessity as it violates the principle of extensionality whereas necessity as expressed by a semantical predicate applicable on names of statement does not hold principle of substitutivity, it leads us to referential opacity. Kripke brought back names to their original nondescriptional status. I have discussed a controversy between proper names and definite descriptions, whether there is some definite description for every proper name or proper names are mere rigid designators. In this context, I have discussed Mill, Frege, Russell, Kripke Plantinga theory on proper names. Within this exercise I have tried to find out if there is any essentialist stance among the views of these analytic philosophers. Finally, I have sought to wind up this work with a leaning towards essentialism...
| Published in | International Journal of Philosophy (Volume 10, Issue 2) |
| DOI | 10.11648/j.ijp.20221002.13 |
| Page(s) | 69-75 |
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Quantified Modal Logic, De Re Modality, Rigid Designator, Transworld Identity
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| [7] | Munitz K. M, Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, Pearson College, London, 1981. |
| [8] | Kripke S Naming and Necessity Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980. |
| [9] | Mill, J. S, A System of Logic, Longmans Green &Co., London, 1875. |
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APA Style
Sagarika Datta. (2022). In Quest of De Re Identity: Whether Its Directly Referential or Attributive. International Journal of Philosophy, 10(2), 69-75. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20221002.13
ACS Style
Sagarika Datta. In Quest of De Re Identity: Whether Its Directly Referential or Attributive. Int. J. Philos. 2022, 10(2), 69-75. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20221002.13
AMA Style
Sagarika Datta. In Quest of De Re Identity: Whether Its Directly Referential or Attributive. Int J Philos. 2022;10(2):69-75. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20221002.13
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Download@article{10.11648/j.ijp.20221002.13,
author = {Sagarika Datta},
title = {In Quest of De Re Identity: Whether Its Directly Referential or Attributive},
journal = {International Journal of Philosophy},
volume = {10},
number = {2},
pages = {69-75},
doi = {10.11648/j.ijp.20221002.13},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20221002.13},
eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijp.20221002.13},
abstract = {We know that metaphysics deals with the ultimate reality: what there is, what really exist? What is the real nature or fundamental structure of the material world? What is the intrinsic property of an object that it could not lack, even if it lacks the property it could not be what it is. I am in quest of that essential attribute that an object must have. How to get that essence: through description or by mere ostension? Are they attributive or directly referential, bare substratum? Is there any real property at all by which we can identify an individual? Is there any real connection between proper name and the individual itself? As Aristotle said Substances are the ultimate subject of predication. There must be a single substance of which we see the attributes. Now among these attributes which one is essential and which properties are accidental? For instance, being human, is an essential property of Socrates but being snub-nosed is an accidental one. In order to search of that essential attribute I have gone through an extensive survey of literature where I have started with Aristotle and followed up with in the views of Quine, Kripke, Plantinga and Adams. For Quine, To Be is To Be the Value of a Variable, words do not have any meaning of its own. It depends on the way we describe it. Quine attacked the possibility of ‘necessity’ on open context. Quine rejected the possibility of de dicto necessity as it violates the principle of extensionality whereas necessity as expressed by a semantical predicate applicable on names of statement does not hold principle of substitutivity, it leads us to referential opacity. Kripke brought back names to their original nondescriptional status. I have discussed a controversy between proper names and definite descriptions, whether there is some definite description for every proper name or proper names are mere rigid designators. In this context, I have discussed Mill, Frege, Russell, Kripke Plantinga theory on proper names. Within this exercise I have tried to find out if there is any essentialist stance among the views of these analytic philosophers. Finally, I have sought to wind up this work with a leaning towards essentialism...},
year = {2022}
}
TY - JOUR T1 - In Quest of De Re Identity: Whether Its Directly Referential or Attributive AU - Sagarika Datta Y1 - 2022/06/14 PY - 2022 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20221002.13 DO - 10.11648/j.ijp.20221002.13 T2 - International Journal of Philosophy JF - International Journal of Philosophy JO - International Journal of Philosophy SP - 69 EP - 75 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2330-7455 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20221002.13 AB - We know that metaphysics deals with the ultimate reality: what there is, what really exist? What is the real nature or fundamental structure of the material world? What is the intrinsic property of an object that it could not lack, even if it lacks the property it could not be what it is. I am in quest of that essential attribute that an object must have. How to get that essence: through description or by mere ostension? Are they attributive or directly referential, bare substratum? Is there any real property at all by which we can identify an individual? Is there any real connection between proper name and the individual itself? As Aristotle said Substances are the ultimate subject of predication. There must be a single substance of which we see the attributes. Now among these attributes which one is essential and which properties are accidental? For instance, being human, is an essential property of Socrates but being snub-nosed is an accidental one. In order to search of that essential attribute I have gone through an extensive survey of literature where I have started with Aristotle and followed up with in the views of Quine, Kripke, Plantinga and Adams. For Quine, To Be is To Be the Value of a Variable, words do not have any meaning of its own. It depends on the way we describe it. Quine attacked the possibility of ‘necessity’ on open context. Quine rejected the possibility of de dicto necessity as it violates the principle of extensionality whereas necessity as expressed by a semantical predicate applicable on names of statement does not hold principle of substitutivity, it leads us to referential opacity. Kripke brought back names to their original nondescriptional status. I have discussed a controversy between proper names and definite descriptions, whether there is some definite description for every proper name or proper names are mere rigid designators. In this context, I have discussed Mill, Frege, Russell, Kripke Plantinga theory on proper names. Within this exercise I have tried to find out if there is any essentialist stance among the views of these analytic philosophers. Finally, I have sought to wind up this work with a leaning towards essentialism... VL - 10 IS - 2 ER -
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